Typhoon , η απάντηση στο J-20 και Τ-50 !(;)
Άρθρο του περιοδικού Eurofighter world
When examining the current great fighters on the market, it is quite common in some quarters to refer to them as ‘Relics of the Cold War’. Machines that were designed to defeat the Flanker- class threat with a considerable margin of superiority and starting from a quantitative disadvantage could easily be accused of
irrelevance today.We are speaking about aircraft whose design did not allow for any compromise in the quest to achieve air supremacy, as this condition was deemed a sine qua non to win decisively and rapidly any con- ventional confrontation with the Warsaw Pact. They are fighters whose superior combat effectiveness would contribute massively to maintaining and increasing the deterrent effect of the Western Forces and to dissuade opponents from even considering a military solution as a viable option.
Today's world is quite differ- ent from that of the Cold War, at least in the West. Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the Far East nor the Middle East, where the potential for geopolit- ical issues still exists and is unlikely to disappear in the short to medium term.In such scenarios, fighters such as Raptor and Typhoon are not, by far, an unnecessary relic of a distant past. In fact it is quite clear that these high-end combat planes must enter the risk reward calculus of any would be aggressor right now. In this sense they are already contributing to a safer world by simply exercising their deterrent value. If powerful military assets such as Raptor and Typhoon in the American and European inventories are already a political and military asset for their air forces their effect would be much more robust should they fly with air forces, of the Far and Mid East countries.
The question of whether the latest generation of western fighters would be an effective way to counter the vigorous rearmament underway in China is more than an academic exercise, as both Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are currently planning some reequipping of their Air Forces’ combat fleets.
Before examining in some detail the technicalities of the different fighter models and their relative suitability to Far Eastern scenarios, it is worth taking a closer look at the political aspects surrounding most procurements of military materiel.
Given the massive presence of the US military in the region and the tight relationship built over decades between the Armed Forces of the respective countries, most of the analysts think that it would seem unrealistic to expect Japan or South Korea to order a European fighter, even if such a product were more suitable for dealing with the threat and for supporting the expansion of their national aviation industry.
It is from such a perspective that the Eurofighter consortium and the four nations behind it have taken the challenging step of entering markets that up to now have been dominated by the US. In a multi-polar world that is becoming ever closer and more interconnected, where the events of the recent past are fading away into history and nations are desiring to exert a more assertive role and render themselves less dependent on a single big power, there is more room for moving away from the strictures of the past and for creating new alliances with the rest of the world.
There is no doubt that in the possible fu- ture, if faced with threat scenarios in North East Asia, the F-22 Raptor would represent the best fighter to achieve the air supremacy necessary to eventually reduce the tension. And there is also no doubt that if such an aircraft were available for export to Japan and South Korea, there would be no reason for Typhoon to be offered to their air forces.
In a defence environment characterised by a growing airborne capability, both in terms of quantity and quality (UAV, cruise missiles, UCAV, new generation fighters like the J-11 and the J-10, stealth fighters like the J-20 or the T-50), the paramount attribute of any new fighter is to add significantly to the overall defence capability to deter and dissuade in the first place. Should this fail, in order to be able to defeat the threat with an ample margin of superiority once the de- sired level of air control is achieved, the ability to swing back to surface attack roles is a necessity.
The Raptor is a fighter eminently suitable for air superiority missions, even though less suitable to swing later on in strike roles. The key attributes making the Raptor the pre-eminent fighter of today are the following design parameters:
• Superb kinematic performance (acceleration, climb and turn rates, supersonic manoeuvrability, supercruise, high thrust loading and low wing loading);Very low observability (VLO) in all aspects; Combination of high speed and VLO to achieve high survivability (as opposed to strike designs with frontal as- pect only stealth and poor kinematics); Big aperture AESA radar and sensor fu- sion; Very high firepower (6 AMRAAM +
2 AIM-9X).
Two additional features that would have significantly improved the air combat effectiveness of the Raptor that were dropped from the original design configuration due to the severe cost escalation of the F-22 programme were:
• AESA radar side arrays (mainly to increase the radar scan volume and thus the fighter survivability in BVR combat); IRST sensor to increase the situational awareness and the passive combat capabilities.
Another significant Raptor limitation is its restricted network capability, as any radio transmission (radar included!) is severely detrimental to a stealthy mode of operation.
Yet another huge penalty due to the VLO design is the heavy maintenance required and the large logistic footprint needed and hence limited mission availability, when compared to a similar fighter with a more conventional survivability design.
As the Raptor is not available for export, the Typhoon’s design characteristics and its operational performance are the next in line, and considerably superior to the legacy fighters on offer today. The same is true for the limited low observable JSF, whose design is optimised for the strike role and requires the support of a true air superiority f ighter in order to operate ef fectively according to the USAF, RAF and Italian Air Force operational requirements.
Typhoon’s kinematic performance with the exception of a lower super cruise speed with the current engine nozzles is in the same class as the Raptor. The survivability equation in Typhoon is resolved through a smart and cost-effective combination of certain stealth technologies, highly sophisticated electronic countermeasures, use of passive and off-board sensors, kinematic manoeuvrability, accurate mission planning and combined / networked formation tactics.
The new Typhoon will soon have the lat- est generation AESA radar (an important at- tribute in a field where the technology is still evolving relatively rapidly). Typhoon’s radar will also incorporate those highly ef- fective scan volume extension features dropped from the Raptor’s design for financial reasons. The antenna is repositionable so as to cover an angular scan of 200 degrees, thus augmenting considerably the survivability in the BVR combat domain and its performance in the SAR mode.
The radar is complemented by passive sensors such as the IRST and the ESM to provide a robustly fused situational awareness and the capability for passive attack tactics.
In terms of missile carriage, both the Raptor and Typhoon design teams have concluded (after comprehensive operational analysis studies) that a 6 MRM + 2 SRM configuration represents the gold standard in air combat. The introduction of the long range Meteor missile will considerably extend the ‘No Escape Zone’ of the missile
shot and the overall air combat capability of Typhoon, something that even the Raptor cannot achieve today.
The synergistic combination of best-in- class kinematic performance, state-of-the- art re-positionable AESA radar and passive IRST, and long-range BVR missiles brings the air combat effectiveness of Typhoon not far short of the Raptor’s level. These results have been validated in several operational analysis simulations and form part of the justif ication for t he investment in such break-through technologies.
Still in store for future combat effective- ness enhancements are growth in engine thrust in the order of 15% to 20%, thrust vectoring nozzles to increase, among many other things, the supercruise speed, and regular avionics and ECM updates.These upgrades will maintain Typhoon’s margin of superiority over the new generation of Russian and Chinese designs, includ- ing stealth designs now in development.
The path leading to such high levels of performance is indeed different from the one chosen by the F-22, though both fight- ers represent the best available on the market today.It is fair to say that the Eurofighter team was aware from the very beginning that the last 10% of extra performance would come
at a very high price, as one would be entering the flat part of the performance-price curve. It is also fair to say that the “combination philosophy” for t he survivability problem versus the VLO design was made with the full knowledge of the stealth de- sign techniques and their negative impact on the size and mass of the fighter, and its acquisition and operating costs (the German Lampyridae project in the 1980s was closely tracking t he black stealt h programmes in the US and was of strategic importance in defining the key design features of Eurofighter Typhoon).
Bearing in mind that the cost to procure and operate a true VLO fighter (not to be confused with a frontal aspect only LO str ike plane like t he JSF) would allow a smaller fleet of aircraft with low mission availability due to heavy stealth mainte- nance, the rationale for a higher number of Typhoons (at the same LCC budget) is quite compelling. It is therefore safe to conclude that Eurofighter Typhoon represents the most cost-effective multirole fighter among combat aircraft in service or under development.
Any air force that has considered the F-22 Raptor as the best solution for their future threat scenarios should carefully assess the multirole capabilities offered by the new Typhoon weapons system and its overall cost-effectiveness. On the contrary, it is hard to believe that an air force that was interested in the Raptor would seriously consider any “stretching” or upgrading of legacy platforms or an unproven LO strike design like the JSF (requiring an F-22 or Typhoon to operate in an air superiority environment), unless it was going to lower its requirements and depend on third parties for the protection of its sovereignty.
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